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An Unfinished Project: John Courtney Murray,
Religious Freedom, and Unresolved Tensions in
Contemporary American Society
Miguel H. Díaz, PhD*
Religious freedom has re-emerged as a controversial issue in the courts,
in the Church, and in the public square in the United States. This essay
examines the groundbreaking contribution that John Courtney Murray, SJ
made to bring about a paradigm shift in Roman Catholic teaching on
religious freedom. This shift can be traced to the Church’s transitioning from
the view that “error has no rights” to only people—not ideas—have rights.
The essay underscores Murray’s focus on human conscience and addresses
tensions that have emerged in the United States between voices that affirm
the right to religious freedom and those that affirm other fundamental human
rights. The essay proposes the adoption of an integral ecology of human
rights built upon an option for the legally and religiously marginalized.
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INTRODUCTION
The figure of John Courtney Murray, SJ (1904–1967) looms large in
discussions of religious freedom and, in particular, when addressing the
paradigm shift that occurred in Roman Catholicism after the 1965 release
of Dignitatis Humanae.1 This central document of the Second Vatican
* The John Courtney Murray University Chair in Public Service at Loyola University Chicago,
Ambassador to Holy See, Ret.
1. Pope Paul VI, Dignitatis Humanae, Declaration on Religious Freedom (Dec. 7, 1965),
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207
_dignitatis-humanae_en.html.
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Council changed the way the Church understood its relationship with a
world characterized by an increasing religious and cultural pluralism.2 As
an American and as a Jesuit, Murray tapped into the complex and
manifold tradition of natural law as a way to reflect upon the American
consensus.3 For Murray, the cornerstone of this consensus within
American democracy was the moral vision that informed the thoughts of
our nation’s founders. Murray saw this moral vision as stemming from a
religiously informed consciousness that affirmed the transcendent rights
of human persons. But this consensus, Murray would argue, cannot be
taken for granted. It is an unfinished project that requires ongoing
reasoned conversations and constructive public dialogue for the sake of
the survival of our democracy.
This American consensus, especially around issues related to the
separation of Church from state, was decisive in Murray’s efforts to
precipitate change in the Catholic Church’s understanding on religious
freedom.4 In spite of the opposition that Murray faced and having been
even silenced by some Church authorities, Dignitatis Humanae witnessed
the triumph of his relentless efforts to draw from the American model of
separating Church and state and from the constitutional affirmation of
inalienable human rights and freedoms.5 In parsing the implications of
2. Unless otherwise noted, due to my focus on John Courtney Murray’s teaching on religious
freedom, the term “Church” will be used exclusively in this article in reference to the Roman
Catholic Church.
3. See JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE
AMERICAN PROPOSITION 115–22, 249–300 (3d ed. 2005) (recognizing that even though natural law
exists and is indestructible, it is not acknowledged, and thus there is no elaboration of public
consensus based on it). It is worth citing what prominent Catholic moral theologian Charles E.
Curran has noted with respect to “natural law.” As Curran argues, “Natural Law remains a very
ambiguous term.” Oftentimes the term “natural” is distinguished from supernatural in a way that
does not sufficiently opt for an integral and incarnational approach to the presence of God in human
history. Moreover, while the concept of natural law is often used by Catholic thinkers in connection
with Thomas Aquinas, the fact is that the term “nature had over twenty different meanings in
Catholic thinking before Thomas Aquinas.” Curran also points out that the term “law” is ambiguous
because for most modern readers it carries an overly legalistic connotation, “whereas for Thomas
law was an ordering of reason.” To summarize Curran’s arguments on natural law:
natural law is a deliberative ethic which arrives at decision not primarily by the
application of laws, but by the deliberation of reason. . . . Natural law in the history of
thought does not refer to a monolithic theory, but tends to be a more generic term which
includes a number of different approaches to moral problems. There is no such thing as
the natural law as a monolithic philosophical system with an agreed upon body of ethical
content existing from the beginning of time.
See Charles E. Curran, Natural Law in Moral Theology, in READINGS IN MORAL THEOLOGY NO.
7: NATURAL LAW AND THEOLOGY 247, 253–54, (Charles E. Curran & Richard A. McCormick
eds., 1991).
4. See generally MURRAY, supra note 3.
5. For a historical overview of the Roman Catholic Church’s teaching on religious freedom and
Murray’s struggle, condemnation, and vindication, see BARRY HUDOCK, STRUGGLE,

2018]

An Unfinished Project

3

the American consensus for the Church’s teaching on religious freedom,
Murray’s most lasting contribution, and certainly most relevant argument
for our time, is his affirmation of “the fundamental inviolability of human
freedom and the supremacy of conscience, even an ill-informed
conscience.”6
Religious freedom has re-emerged as a key and highly controversial
issue within our increasingly polarized society. Within a pluralistic and
religiously diverse global reality, our American public consensus faces
new challenges. In this sense, Murray’s voice resonates with the signs of
our times.7 Today, defending religious freedom—this constitutional and
most basic of human rights—demands that we consider anew questions
of religious freedom, ever so mindful of the relationship this right carries
with respect to other human rights. We must make sure that, under the
banner of religious freedom, no one person or group of persons engages
in unlawful discrimination.
Within America’s democratic legislative system, proponents and
opponents of various laws and policies continue to invoke the protections
afforded to religious principles and beliefs, seeking the equilibrium
Murray dubbed public order. Critically engaging the role of religion
within the public square has never been a more necessary task. From
cake-baking to cage-making, religion and the First Amendment are at the
heart of national debates and legal cases that affect not only the right of
religious expression for millions of documented and undocumented
“Americans,” but also issues of public peace, public morality, and
justice.8 As the weight of these issues carry them as far as the Supreme
COMMENDATION, VINDICATION: JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY’S JOURNEY TOWARD VATICAN II
(2015). See also John Coleman, The Achievement of Religious Freedom, 24 U.S. CATH. HISTORIAN
21, 21–32 (discussing the identities of the “principal opposing actors or contending parties who
helped to make Dignitatis the most deeply contested document of Vatican II,” the processes through
which the document eventuated and how those processes effected what it ultimately said, and the
reasons the document is frequently considered a part of Catholic social teaching); Joseph A.
Komonchak, The American Contribution to Dignitatis Humanae: The Role of John Courtney
Murray, S.J., 24 U.S. CATH. HISTORIAN 1, 1–20 (explaining Murray’s role in “the Catholic doctrine
of religious freedom”); Pietro Pavan, Declaration on Religious Feeedom, in 4 COMMENTARY ON
THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 49–86 (Herbert Vorgrimler ed., Hilda Graef, W.J. O’Hara, &
Ronald Walls trans., 1975) (explaining the schematic structure of the Constitution “De Ecclesia”).
6. ROBERT MCCLORY, FAITHFUL DISSENTERS: STORIES OF MEN AND WOMEN WHO LOVED
AND CHANGED THE CHURCH 12 (2000).
7. See John F. Quinn, The Enduring Influence of We Hold These Truths, 16 CATH. SOC. SCI.
REV. 73, 73–84 (2011) (explaining the lasting effect of Murray’s teachings).
8. Murray argued that the state is primarily responsible for public order, and he limited the
goods that could be achieved by the power of the state to three: public peace, public morality (by
which he understood commonly accepted moral standards), and justice. “The public order thus
becomes the criterion which controls and justifies the intervention of the state in all matters
including the area of religion.” See CHARLES E. CURRAN, AMERICAN CATHOLIC SOCIAL ETHICS:
TWENTIETH-CENTURY APPROACHES 197 (1982) (describing that a “principle in Murray’s
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Court, and as friends and foes of religion weaponize religious freedom
within the public square, Murray’s advice to Catholics is as relevant today
as it was when he first offered it in 1960.9 As he suggests, the importance
of affirming religious freedom must be understood as a moral
commitment to foster peace and public order within the pluralistic
American democracy:
The American Catholic is on good ground when he refuses to make an
ideological idol out of religious freedom and separation of church and
state, when he refuses to “believe” in them as articles of faith. He takes
the highest ground available in this matter of the relations between
religion and government when he asserts that his commitment to the
religion clauses of the Constitution is a moral commitment to them as
articles of peace in a pluralist society.10

Murray’s careful distinction between faith and politics and his
invitation to Catholics to commit to hold the government responsible for
maintaining public order and peace within our pluralistic American
society carries many implications when considering the widespread
social experience of polarization and cultural wars at this moment in
American history. As a Roman Catholic, Murray reflected the Catholic
analogical imagination’s attempt to reject polarizing positions, especially
seeking a rapprochement between Catholicism and American
democracy, between faith and reason, between the body of Christ and
body politic, and, ultimately, between believer and citizen.11 As a Jesuit,
he reflected a religious tradition steeped in the practice of discerning
God’s presence in ordinary daily living, embracing the goodness of the
world, but also distinguishing through holy indifference, God from
anyone or anything that dared to take the place of God.12 Because of this,
Murray called upon government not to interfere in religious matters,
which laid outside its competency.13
understanding of the constitutional government is the distinction between the common good and
the public order”).
9. See generally MURRAY, supra note 3.
10. Id. at 86 (emphasis added). See CURRAN, supra note 8, at 217 (describing religious liberty
as a “social necessity” necessary for peace and civil accord in a “religiously pluralistic society”).
11. See generally DAVID TRACY, THE ANALOGICAL IMAGINATION: CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY
AND THE CULTURE OF PLURALISM (1981) (identifying the difference between analogical and other
viewpoints of faith by examining the culture of pluralism and the main differences in Christian
theological doctrines).
12. See collected essays by Michael J. Schuck, Mark Williams, Leon Hooper & Thomas
Hughson, in FINDING GOD IN ALL THINGS: CELEBRATING BERNARD LONERGAN, JOHN
COURTNEY MURRAY, AND KARL RAHNER 83–124 (Mark Bosco & David Stagaman eds., 2007)
(discussing “the American stories Murray lived within as he conducted his research and writing”
and suggesting their “bearing on Murray’s scholarship, particularly his notions of freedom and
truth”).
13. Id.
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In this Article, I will offer a brief overview of Murray’s ideas
connected to religious freedom and pose some questions regarding the
ongoing realization of this unfinished project as new questions and
challenges arise. First, I will briefly discuss Murray’s arguments in
relation to the American consensus, which he lamented no longer existed
and was in need of renewal.14 Murray’s reasoned historical approach
remains relevant as we seek public consensus in defending religious
freedom while also equally upholding a plurality of other fundamental
human rights. Second, I will summarize Murray’s notion of religious
freedom, highlighting the place that individual conscience exercises in
his thought. Third, I will conclude with some observations on current
unresolved questions within the United States related to religious
freedom, underscoring the unfinished nature of this project and the need
to revisit the complexity of this fundamental constitutional right. I will
argue that in light of recent developments since the late 1960s in the
Church, any effort to advance religious freedom and achieve consensus
in the service of public order must address the option for and the rights
of marginalized persons and communities.
Respect for the human dignity and conscience of oppressed and
marginalized communities within the Church and society, coupled with
defending religious freedom of all persons, is the litmus test to reject what
Pope Francis has called “the globalization of human indifference” and the
surest road toward an integral ecology of human rights.15 Today, we must
engage one another in order to reach a new American consensus, mindful
of the fundamental value of religious freedom, but also aware of a
growing global consciousness that has been birthed as a result of the
irruption of various oppressed and marginalized subjects into history. In
the spirit of Murray’s groundbreaking efforts, we must honor and protect,
against any form of religious or social external coercion, the individual
and communal religious convictions of these subjects, their theological
and reasoned approaches to individual and socio-political experiences,
and their God-given dignity and constitutional rights.

14. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 93–94.
15. One of the earliest uses of the term “globalization of human indifference” was in the homily
Pope Francis gave in Lampedusa Island, comparable to our Ellis Island. The pope characterized the
lack of justice and care for immigrants as reflecting this global indifference. See Pope Francis,
Homily at “Arena” Sports Camp, Salina Quarter (July 8, 2013), https://w2.vatican.va/
content/francesco/en/homilies/2013/documents/papa-francesco_20130708_omelialampedusa.html (asking “forgiveness for those who by their decisions on the global level have
created situations that lead to” the tragic deaths of individuals attempting to circumvent the closed
borders of neighboring countries).
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I. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY AND THE AMERICAN CONSENSUS
In a series of essays grouped under “the American proposition,”
Murray lays out his arguments regarding how to achieve unity within an
American pluralistic society. Murray makes the case for constructing “a
new act of intellectual affirmation, comparable to those which launched
the American constitutional commonwealth, that will newly put us in
possession of the public philosophy, the basic consensus that we need.”16
In advocating for a recipe for this public consensus, Murray relies heavily
on select basic principles of natural law: (1) human persons are intelligent
creatures; (2) reality is intelligible; and (3) because reality can be
rationally understood, human persons have an ethical obligation to act or
abstain from action for the sake of the common good.17
Murray follows Thomas Aquinas who argued that “[s]ince a rational
soul is the proper form of man, there is in every man a natural inclination
to act according to reason; and this is to act according to virtue.” 18 Of
course, Murray is aware that the use of reason in and of itself does not
guarantee virtue.19 Moreover, Murray is clear that while this capacity to
reason and reach for good is part of the permanent structure in the human
person, the human person is never an abstract and ahistorical essence.20
Much scholarly debate surrounds Murray’s approach to natural law,
especially the question of whether his methodology sufficiently and
consistently incorporated historical consciousness into consideration.21
Critics of Murray may see echoes of the Roman lawyer Ulpian in his
interpretation of natural law and what at times seems to be a failure to

16. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 93.
17. Id. at 111–12.
18. Id. at 113. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Pt. I-II, q. 93, art. 3 (1485)
(arguing “every law is derived from the eternal law”).
19. For instance, Murray argues that in wiser and more honest persons the dynamism to act
according to reason and virtue “is more fully released and more purified.” MURRAY, supra note 3,
at 119.
20. Id. at 114. See MIGUEL H. DÍAZ, ON BEING HUMAN: U.S. HISPANIC AND RAHNERIAN
PERSPECTIVES 79–110 (2001) for a discussion on the dynamic, mutable, historical, and relational
nature of human persons.
21. Leon Hooper has persuasively traced the shift that occurs in Murray’s understanding of
natural law from an ahistorical perspective to one that takes history more seriously into account:
In [essay] 1945b, natural law is an a-historical, a-social, complete body of general truth
statements. By [essay] 1950a, Murray recognized some movement in the tertiary
principles of natural law. By his 1958a [essay], he called for a refounding of America’s
constitutionalism on critical, not naïve, natural law premises, and in Chapters 3 and 4 he
fully recognized the essentially social component of natural law affirmations.
Leon Hooper, The Theological Sources of John Courtney Murray’s Ethics, in JOHN COURTNEY
MURRAY & THE GROWTH OF TRADITION 106, 118 (J. Leon Hooper & Todd David Whitmore eds.,
1996).
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fully integrate issues related to faith and issues related to public order.22
Still, others have pointed to Murray’s embrace of an approach that moves
away from abstract natural law tradition, one that pays more attention to
historical consciousness and the “exigences” of human persons.23
Notwithstanding these varying traditions of interpretation to his thought,
the fact remains that Murray comes to understand the American
consensus as something that should not be simply taken for granted, but
rather embraced as a historical project. As such, this consensus entails an
ongoing process that needs to be actualized in accordance with the nature
of human persons as both rational and as historical creatures.24 The role
of reason, exercised within (and not outside) historical contexts, remains
indispensable to this process. Thus, Murray argues:
But history, as any history book shows, does change what I have called
the human reality. It evokes situations that never happened before. It
calls into being relationships that had not existed. It involves human life
in an increasing multitude of institutions of all kinds, which proliferate
in response to new human needs and desires, as well as in consequence
of the creative possibilities that are inexhaustibly resident in human
freedom. . . . In a word, it has been abundantly proved in history that
the nature of man is a historical nature. “The nature of man is
susceptible of change,” St. Thomas repeatedly states. History
continually changes the community of mankind and alters the modes of
communication between man and man, as these take form “through
external acts,” as St. Thomas says. In this sense, the nature of man
changes in history, for better or for worse; at the same time that the
fundamental structure of human nature, and the essential destinies of
the human person, remain untouched and intact.25
22. Ulpian was a third-century Roman lawyer who, as some have argued, has left a lasting
influence on natural law proponents, including Thomas Aquinas. Curran argues that
Ulpian’s understanding of the natural law logically leads to disastrous consequences in
anthropology. The distinction between two parts in humans—that which is common to
humans and all the animals, and that which is proper to humans—results in a two-layer
version of human beings. A top layer of rationality is merely added to an already
constituted bottom layer of animality. The union between the two layers is merely
extrinsic—the one lies on top of the other. The animal layer retains its own finalities and
tendencies, independent of the demands of rationality. Thus the individual may not
interfere in the animal processes and finalities. Note that the results of such an
anthropology are most evident in the area of sexuality.
Curran, supra note 3, at 257.
23. See Todd David Whitmore, Immunity or Empowerment?, in JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY &
THE GROWTH OF TRADITION, supra note 21, at 149, 150–51 (“From 1964 on, Murray attempts to
ground religious freedom less on perduring factors of human nature—though the emphasis on such
factors remains in the background—and more on what he calls the ‘exigences’ of the human person
at the present stage of human history.”).
24. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 87–122.
25. Id. at 114.
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Later in this Article, I will return to this argument regarding the
historical nature of human persons, the use of reason, and their relevance
for addressing contemporary issues related to religious freedom. It
suffices for now to underscore that this twofold nature of the human being
as a rational and historical creature are essential ingredients upon which
to build public consensus not as a matter of fact, but as Murray argued,
as a matter of need for the sake of the public good.26 Murray maintained
that there was “need for a new moral act of purpose and a new act of
intellectual affirmation, comparable to those which launched the
American constitutional commonwealth, that will newly put us in
possession of the public philosophy, the basic consensus that we need.”27
As I will argue shortly, the polarization we are experiencing surrounding
issues of religious freedom and discrimination call for reasoned
approaches in service to peace and public order. Polarization reflects the
failure to integrate human differences, including religious diversity. The
ancient question of reconciling the one with the many is certainly a
central question in Murray’s writings, and remains relevant today.
Murray correlates the constitutional affirmation of religious freedom
with the need to keep peace in a society comprised of religious pluralism.
He devotes much effort to commenting on the American motto, e pluribus
unum—one out of many—and relating this motto to issues of religious
diversity and public consensus. In so doing, he strongly advocates that
“the public consensus, on which civil unity is ultimately based, must
permit to the differing communities the full integrity of their own
religious convictions.”28 But one cannot emphasize enough that pluralism
as Murray suggests, whether religiously or culturally engendered, is the
precondition to realize unity. Indeed, unity is not to be equated with
sameness, as is often the case in efforts to construct the common good.
Unity that authentically builds the common good must be understood as
the ability of any society to subsist in human differences. Echoing
Christian theological arguments related to the very nature of God as one
and triune (a God who subsists in interpersonal differences as Father,
Son, and Spirit), Murray argues that we are made one American society
through “subsisting amid multiple pluralisms.”29 In this sense, oneness,
26. Id. at 93–94.
27. Id. at 93.
28. Id. at 59. For Murray’s arguments concerning historical reasons for the constitutional basis
of our American religious plurality as a basis for peace, see id. at 68–74.
29. Id. at 44; see Joseph A. Komonchak, John Courtney Murray and the Redemption of History:
Natural Law and Theology, in JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY & THE GROWTH OF TRADITION, supra
note 21, at 60, 63–65 (describing Murray’s specific appeal to Trinitarian theology in his effort to
reject both liberal individualism and various forms of collectivism, like Bolshevism, Nazism, and
Fascism). As a fruitful theological point of contact, the reader should note how Murray’s arguments
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whether in relation to divine or human life, is not about creating sameness
and melting away human differences. Nor does oneness precede or stand
above pluralism. As the American motto, e pluribus unum, clearly
suggests, pluralism is constitutive of unity. A plurality of views,
arguments, and experiences, Murray would concur, is a necessary feature
to the health of our American democracy. Pluralism is the sine qua non
of reaching public consensus.
Consistent with his understanding of human persons as rational and
historical creatures, Murray offers some reflections that describe the
origin, nature, and purpose of the kind of consensus he envisions within
this pluralistic American society. 30 Murray squarely places consensus as
a historical process and not as a fait accompli. It is “doctrine—not,
however, in the sense of Platonic dogma, but in the sense that the word
carries when used by a lawyer or by a military strategist.” 31 It is not a
finished product. Like Catholic doctrine itself, it is “not a finished, but a
developing, body of doctrine” that does not contain everything there is to
know at any given moment in history, but constantly incorporates new
insights and experiences.32 As such, consensus is subject to ongoing
reexamination, criticism, and revision. At the same time, this consensus
is not unguided. It draws from a shared wealth of insights, thoughts,
wisdom, and experiences.33
While Murray affirms the relation between public consensus and
public opinion, he cautions against equating the two. He characterizes
public opinion as the “shorthand” phrase that expresses communally
echo similar arguments that have been made in reconciling unity and diversity in the area of
ecclesiology and with respect to the doctrine of God. For instance, in a now well-known piece,
Cardinal Walter Kasper argued:
The one church of Jesus Christ exists in and from the local churches. It exists, therefore,
in each local church; it is present there especially in the celebration of the Eucharist. It
follows that there can be no local church in isolation, for its own sake, but only in
communion with all other local churches.
Walter Kasper, On the Church—A Friendly Reply to Cardinal Ratzinger, AMERICA (Apr. 23,
2001),
available
at
https://web.archive.org/web/20050206035736/http://
www.americamagazine.org/gettext.cfm?articleTypeID=1&textID=1569&issueID=333.
For
similar arguments related to the doctrine of God, see JOHN D. ZIZIOULAS, BEING AS
COMMUNION: STUDIES IN PERSONHOOD AND THE CHURCH 27–65 (1985).
30. In the arguments that follow regarding the origins, nature, and purpose of public consensus,
I rely on and paraphrase MURRAY, supra note 3, at 102–09. Of particular interest is Murray’s
critical conversation with and appropriation of ADOLF A. BERLE JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY
(1959). As such, Murray’s arguments on public consensus reflect Berle’s economic
presuppositions. That said, it is clear that his arguments on how to reach public consensus carry
wider implications, especially within our contemporary American context of polarization.
31. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 108.
32. Id. at 105.
33. Id.
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reached decisions stemming from “unstated but very real premises.”34
Consensus refers to the acceptance of these premises that have come into
communal consciousness.35 And the primary task of developing this
consensus, the tribunal of accountability, belongs collectively to
“university professors, the reasoned opinions of specialists, the
statements of responsible journalists, and at times the solid
pronouncements of respected politicians.”36 Murray argues that, within
our democracy, this public consensus is the “final arbiter” that acts as a
checking mechanism against any abuse of power.37 Public consensus can
draw from “settled principles of law” but also “the capacity to criticize
that law.”38 Finally, Murray maintains that this public consensus is not
an ideology but rather a living process of tapping into communal
consciousness in light of remaining in close relation to concrete human
experiences.39
To then summarize Murray’s dynamic concept of public consensus,
first and foremost, consensus is the child of thoughtful human reasoning
that emerges within history. It is a process that must be revisited
repeatedly in light of new questions and new experiences. Consensus
must be built and developed, tapping into the ordinary, common, and
shared wisdom of “We the People” of these United States, and also upon
the wisdom that can be derived from a wide range of experts on any given
social challenge. Finally, consensus acts as a check and balance for our
democracy against any abuse of power, especially against any effort that
undermines the ongoing American project to build oneness out of a rich
human pluralism. In the next section, I turn to Murray’s understanding of
religious pluralism and specifically, the question of religious freedom. In
the final section, I will revisit his understanding of public consensus and
relate it to contemporary debates on religious freedom and
nondiscrimination, especially taking up the subject of an integral ecology
of human rights and the preferential option for the poor and marginalized
subjects.
II. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, AND THE AMERICAN
MODEL OF CHURCH AND STATE
The constitutional affirmation of America as the one nation that exists
under God and subsists within the pluralism of religious traditions leaves
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id. at 106.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 108.
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a lasting mark in the Church’s Vatican II teaching on religious freedom,
Dignitatis Humanae. Murray’s arguments on religious freedom can be
traced to a series of articles published in the 1940s and 1950s in
Theological Studies, a prominent theological American and Jesuit
Journal.40 His teaching on this matter can be summarized as follows: All
human persons are equal in dignity before God because all are
independent, responsible, and autonomous creatures; human persons are
the foundations and end of social life; religious freedom can be restricted
where public peace or justice are threatened; all persons are equal under
the law; and all social institutions, including governments, have a primary
responsibility to support human dignity and freedom.41
David Hollenbach, SJ argues that the claim that human persons act by
their “own counsel and purpose, using and enjoying [their] freedom,
moved, not by external coercion, but internally by the risk of [their] whole
existence,” places the responsibility of becoming, of actualization of
humanity, and of ethical decision-making, directly upon the conscience
of individuals.42 No one—not God, government, or the Church—can
substitute or undermine human responsibility. 43 But, governments and
social institutions have a duty to protect human dignity, freedom, and
conscience. Hollenbach draws attention to the relationship between moral
and juridical orders, quoting Murray who argues, “the juridical order

40. See, e.g., John Courtney Murray, Current Theology: Freedom of Religion, 6 THEOLOGICAL
STUD. 85, 85–113 (1945) (commenting on the influence global events have on the freedom of
religion); John Courtney Murray, Freedom of Religion I: The Ethical Problem, 6 THEOLOGICAL
STUD. 229, 229–86 (1945) (describing the ethical problem presented by the freedom of religion
and applicable historic and theoretical approaches to that problem); John Courtney Murray, Current
Theology: On Religious Freedom, 10 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 409, 409–32 (1949) (responding to
articles “dealing with the urgent contemporary problem of religious freedom and the relations
between Church and state”); John Courtney Murray, Leo XIII On Church and State: The General
Structure of the Controversy, 14 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 1, 1–30 (1953) [hereinafter Leo XIII On
Church and State] (outlining the “Leonine” documents “relevant to the problem of Church and
State”); John Courtney Murray, Leo XIII: Separation of Church and State, 14 THEOLOGICAL STUD.
145, 145–214 (1953) [hereinafter Leo XIII: Separation of Church and State] (describing how Pope
Leo XIII understood the separation of Church and state as “both . . . an ideology and . . . a political
and social program”); John Courtney Murray, Leo XIII: Two Concepts of Government, 14
THEOLOGICAL STUD. 551, 551–67 (1953) [hereinafter Leo XIII: Two Concepts of Government]
(indicating two concepts of government—political and paternal—and their interaction with
religion); John Courtney Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom, 25 THEOLOGICAL STUD.
503, 503–75 (1964) [hereinafter The Problem of Religious Freedom] (realizing the “differences
among political traditions and regimes, and the divergences in the historical experiences of the
nations,” and addressing “the more difficult problem of Christian communities in lands of nonChristian tradition and culture”).
41. David Hollenbach, Freedom and Truth: Religious Liberty as Immunity and Empowerment,
in JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY & THE GROWTH OF TRADITION, supra note 21, at 129, 142–43.
42. Id. at 141.
43. Id. at 142.
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cannot be sundered from the moral order, any more than the human
person can be halved.”44 Thus, in dealing with the question of
government and its obligation to respect human conscience, religious
freedom, and human dignity, government cannot undermine the nature of
persons as religious and as responsible selves. The “truth to which
government is accountable is the truth of human dignity, the truth that in
matters religious, as in all matters in which human beings’ very selves
are determined.”45 Human persons must enjoy immunity from eternal
coercion, and governments can only interfere where public peace and
justice are threatened.
Murray’s reflections on religious freedom also challenged the Roman
Catholic claim of being the one true faith and sole possessor of the one
religious truth. In this model, known as error has no right, truths in other
religious traditions had little room to be recognized and no possibility of
salvation outside this visible body (“Extra Ecclesiam Nulla Salus”).46
Murray convinced the Church to move beyond this envisioned ideal,
known as “Catholic Thesis,” which could never be realized in modern
democratic states, and even beyond the more pragmatic approach of
simply tolerating the status quo, known as the “Catholic Hypothesis.”
Murray’s approach embraces the possibility of encountering truth, even
religiously-constructed truths, within the “catholicity” of cultural and
religious traditions and accepts religious pluralism as a matter of
historical fact and value.47 There is little doubt that Murray’s ideas
brought about a cultural shift in official Roman Catholic teaching. The
American separation of Church and state and, in particular, the First
Amendment, propelled his inspiration.
Murray’s case for distinguishing Church from state, and state from
society, followed Leo XIII’s distinguishing the temporal power of the
state from the spiritual power of the Church, carried enormous
implications for the Church’s understanding of the role of religion in the

44. Id.
45. Id. at 143.
46. See generally FRANCIS A. SULLIVAN, SALVATION OUTSIDE THE CHURCH?: TRACING THE
HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC RESPONSE (Paulist Press 1992) (studying the history of Christian
thought about the salvation of outsiders to determine whether the dogma that there is no truth
outside the Church is a true Catholic dogma).
47. On the pre-Vatican II views that came to be known as the Catholic Thesis-Hypothesis on
religious freedom, see The Problem of Religious Freedom, supra note 40. See also MCCLORY,
supra note 6, at 7–8 (describing the “Catholic Thesis” as the rigid supposition “that the vast
majority (if not all) of the citizens of the state were Catholic,” and the “Catholic Hypothesis” as the
pragmatic position Church authorities took in response to the fall of Catholic monarchs, advocating
Church authorities in the eightenteenth and nineteenth centuries “tolerate non-Catholic states until
such time as the Catholic population grew into the majority”).
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public square within modern democracies.48 The American model of
freedom from religion, rather than freedom of religion offered a particular
and unique way of relating God and Caesar. Rather than excluding the
church and religion from contributing to society, the American model
offered the Catholic Church and other religious traditions “immunity”
from government while also allowing the possibility for religion to
contribute constructively to the common good. At this point, it is worth
recalling the distinction that Murray makes between state and society,
noting its relation to public order and the common good:
The common good is the responsibility of all persons and institutions
within society. It consists of the full range of conditions that facilitate
human fulfillment. The state is responsible only for the public order,
which consists of the conditions necessary for the mere coexistence of
persons in society. . . . Murray enumerates three goods under the rubric
of public order: public peace, public morality, and justice. Only when
these are violated can the state justly intervene with its coercive
powers.49

Even more revolutionary than his arguments surrounding the
separation of Church from state, was Murray’s affirmation of human
dignity and human conscience, undoubtedly also influenced by
inalienable and constitutionally enshrined rights in the United States. As
Murray’s commentators have noted, the increased historical emphasis in
his writings led to greater attention to the “exigencies” of human persons,
including, but not limited to, human conscience and dignity. This carries
great contemporary relevance.50 In arguing that individual persons have
a God-given duty to freely exercise their consciences unencumbered by
any form of external coercion, Murray not only challenged states to
respect religious freedom and conscience, but indirectly, this focus on
human conscience and religious freedom also challenges the Church to
refrain from exercising any external coercion on its faithful citizens.
More specifically, this focus on individual conscience challenges the
Church to refrain from turning to the ministerial exception, an exception
to nondiscrimination laws for religious institutions enshrined in United
States law, as a way to justify external coercion.51 One need read no
48. See Leo XIII On Church and State, supra note 40, at 1–30 (arguing “the struggle is between
‘the church’ and ‘the sects,’” which are activist parties in search of political powers); Leo XIII:
Separation of Church and State, supra note 40, at 145–214 (analyzing Leo XIII’s theory regarding
the practice of “Church-State relationships amid the conditions created by the peculiar nineteenthcentury plight of the so-called Catholic nations of Europe and Latin America”); Leo XIII: Two
Concepts of Government, supra note 40, at 551–67 (understanding the political and paternal
concepts of government and their roles influencing the modern democracy).
49. Whitmore, supra note 23, at 155.
50. Id. at 161–71.
51. The ministerial exception is an exception to discrimination laws for religious institutions
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further than past the opening words of Dignitatis Humanae to witness the
profound effect this historical shift to human conscience had on Church
teaching and the value it still carries with respect to checking potential
abuses that could come from the state, but also from religious institutions:
A sense of the dignity of the human person has been impressing itself
more and more deeply on the consciousness of contemporary man, and
the demand is increasingly made that men should act on their own
judgment, enjoying and making use of a responsible freedom, not
driven by coercion but motivated by a sense of duty.52

III. AN UNFINISHED PROJECT: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, PUBLIC CONSENSUS,
AND THE AFFIRMATION OF HUMAN CONSCIENCES TODAY
Embracing a profound realism and pluralism, Murray was convinced
that context is decisive and that, as he said, “[i]f we are to interpret the
world, as we must, even to itself, our first duty is to understand it, in
detail, with full realism under abnegation of the easy generalities with
which the world is ordinarily denounced.”53 In considering and
interpreting the details of the world in its historical circumstances,
Murray’s methodology invites us to examine the various cultural and
diverse contexts that must now be taken into account to interpret and
further develop the Church’s teaching on religious freedom. From this
perspective, the recent irruption into history of various marginalized
persons, which has carried enormous impact in the field of religious
studies and theology, must also impact the field of law, its interpretation,
and its implementation. These persons, faithful citizens that participate
and contribute to both Church and society, have often experienced
marginalization, discrimination, and human rights violations on the basis
of their race, gender, sexual orientation, physical ability, immigration
status, and the like.54 Their cry must be heard in order to justly interpret
when they limit who may serve in positions within their place of worship. See Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012) (affirming the ministerial
exception to discrimination laws).
52. Pope Paul VI, Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 1, at para. 1.
53. DONALD E. PELOTTE, JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY: THEOLOGIAN IN CONFLICT 17 (1976).
54. The role religion has played in various forms of human oppression within the American
continent has been amply explored. See, e.g., PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED
(2000); ROSEMARY RADFORD RUETHER, SEXISM AND GOD-TALK: TOWARD A FEMINIST
THEOLOGY (1983); MARCELLA ALTHAUS-REID, INDECENT THEOLOGY: THEOLOGICAL
PERVERSIONS IN SEX, GENDER AND POLITICS (2000); JAMES H. CONE, THE CROSS AND THE
LYNCHING TREE (2011); UNCOMMON FAITHFULNESS: THE BLACK CATHOLIC EXPERIENCE (M.
Shawn Copeland ed., 2009); NANCY L. EIESLAND, THE DISABLED GOD: TOWARD A LIBERATORY
THEOLOGY OF DISABILITY (1994); JONATHAN Y. TAN, ASIAN AMERICAN THEOLOGIES (2008);
FROM THE HEART OF OUR PEOPLE: LATINO/A EXPLORATIONS IN CATHOLIC SYSTEMATIC
THEOLOGY (Orlando O. Espín & Miguel H. Díaz eds., 1999).
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and implement the laws of our nation. This preferential option for the
legally and religiously marginalized, if I may be allowed to coin this
phrase, provides a new opportunity and a new public lens from which to
build public consensus. Their views have often been unrepresented,
underrepresented, or neglected in our courts.
Since the late 1960s, individual Christian churches, other religious
bodies, and, most recently, the Catholic Church in the figure of Pope
Francis, have made a more conscientious effort to protect the
marginalized and oppressed and defend their individual conscience and
human dignity.55 Following this historical consciousness and embracing
an integral ecology of human rights requires that we work to build bridges
between advocates of religious freedom, on the one hand, and all other
advocates of human rights on the other. This means that the entities of the
state, the Church, and society, entities where voices of Catholics are often
encountered, must work together for the benefit of all.
The Catholic axiom affirming subsidiarity still holds within this newly
acquired historical option for the marginalized: “as much religious
freedom as possible; only as much restriction as necessary to protect the
public order.”56 But an equally important, and sometimes neglected
Catholic social teaching is also the principle of solidarity, especially
solidarity with the “indecent,” the “lynched,” the “undocumented” of
history—those who suffer marginalization.57 In situations where tensions
arise between Church authorities and the law and in matters concerning
persons who experience marginalization within the Church and society,
the Church would be well served to follow the example of Murray who
argued that Pope Pius XII’s teaching “goes much further [than affirming
religious diversity] when he flatly states that ‘in certain circumstances
God does not give men any mandate . . . to impede or to repress what is
erroneous and false.’ The First Amendment is simply the legal
enunciation of this papal statement.”58
In this case, this mandate and the respect for religious freedom ought
to apply ad intra with respect to the Church and its institutional exercise
of religious freedom.
Society’s concience related to fundamantal human rights associated
with marginalized communities continues to grow and expand. At the
55. On liberating theologies and their emergence in response to the cry of the “poor,” where
being “poor” means human oppression in various manifestations, see generally MIGUEL A. DE LA
TORRE, INTRODUCING LIBERATIVE THEOLOGIES (2015).
56. See Hollenbach, supra note 41, at 143 (discussing this general principle in the context of
religious liberty as empowerment).
57. On the principle of subsidiary, see Gregorio Guitán, Juan XXIII y la encíclica Pacem in
terris: La relación entre bien común y subsidiaridad, 46 SCRIPTA THEOLOGICA 381, 381–99 (2014).
58. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 73–74.
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same time, polarization seems to grow between advocates of religious
freedom and those favoring nondiscrimination laws. Because of this
dichotomy, there is today a great urgency to bridge the two sides and to
use the defense of religious freedom as an opportunity to defend other
basic human rights. The dismissal of LGBTQ persons from religiously
affiliated institutions, including Catholic institutions, and recent court
rulings in this area offer examples of how religious freedom and
nondiscrimination principles have not achieved just resolution in
American society.59 The Church is not a monolithic institution. Among
other areas, there is great pluralism of religious experience and
theological perspectives regarding the controversial debates surrounding
human sexuality and reproductive rights.60 But this religious and
theological diversity, which concerns the individual consciences of
millions of Americans, has yet to make its impact on court rulings.
Murray was able to see that the agent and bearer of political power was
no longer the state, but now, that agency belonged to the citizen and
Christian (civis idem et Christianus).61 But citizen-Christians come in
great varieties, belong to different Christian churches and political
parties, and differ with respect to their communally, ecclesially, socially,
and religiously informed consciences. Notwithstanding this pluralism, all
of them, as well as those who identify with other religious traditions, no
religious tradition, and even those who are not citizens, deserve equal
59. See, e.g., Collette v. Archdiocese of Chi., 200 F. Supp. 3d 730 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (ruling
against a director of worship and music that claimed he was fired for intending to marry male
partner); Duaa Eldeib, Court Rules Against Gay Man Who Sued Catholic Church Over Firing, CHI.
TRIB. (June 8, 2017, 7:07 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-catholicchurch-gay-employee-lawsuit-met-20170607-story.html (dismissing claim of a man married to
another man); Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., No. 1:16-CV-11576, 2017 WL 4339817
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2017) (finding in favor of the Church on an employment discrimination claim
based on sexual orientation). See also Joy P. Waltemath, Ministerial Exception Nixes Married Gay
Music Director’s Discriminatory Discharge Claims, EMP’T L. DAILY, http://www.
employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/news/ministerial-exception-nixes-married-gay-musicdirector-discriminatory-discharge-claims/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2018) (explaining the holding of
Demkovich); Thorson v. Billy Graham Evangelistic Ass’n, 687 N.W.2d 652 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004)
(affirming the dismissal of claim by a woman arguing she was terminated because she was a
lesbian); Doe v. Lutheran High Sch., 702 N.W.2d 322 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming the
dismissal of an employment discrimination claim of a pastor and teacher arguing his religious high
school fired him after he disclosed he was gay); Egan v. Hamline United Methodist Church, 679
N.W.2d 350 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (dismissing state human rights claims filed by a discharged
bisexual music director).
60. See generally CHARLES E. CURRAN, CATHOLIC MORAL THEOLOGY IN THE UNITED
STATES: A HISTORY (2008).
61. See Charles E. Curran, The Role of the Laity in the Thought of John Courtney Murray, in
JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY & THE GROWTH OF TRADITION, supra note 21, at 241, 250, 253
(analyzing the state and human person as a dyarchy over the First Amendment and recognizing in
the human person a spiritual power that stands above it).
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protection under the law. State and religious institutions have an ethical
obligation to respect the right of persons to assume responsibility for their
self-actualization, guarding themselves against any form of external
coercion. All citizens deserve the right to be protected against threats that
undermine this God-given capacity to risk one’s whole existence in the
process of self-actualization and becoming a creature alive for the greater
glory of God (ad majorem Dei gloriam).
The state must respect religious expressions and beliefs, and not just
the freedom of worship. And the Church in turn needs to become ever
more cognizant and respectful of the pluralism of its citizen-believers.
While Murray would surely stand on the side of conscience, and yes, a
conscience formed by the Church, our contemporary notions of Church
are more complex, more historically informed, more dynamic, and more
inclusive, moving beyond the institutional dimension. 62 Perhaps more
than ever before, the people of God, exercising their sensus fidelium, have
informed their consciences with respect to issues of religion and religious
freedom.63 Thus, within our historical context, it is not only the state that
must be cautioned against interfering on matters of conscience, but, in
some cases, religious institutions and their representatives must also be
cautioned. Clearly, in defense of human dignity and conscience and
against the abuse of religious freedom, the very document that Murray
steered into official Church teaching, Dignitatis Humanae, affirms that
society “has the right to defend itself against possible abuses committed
on the pretext of freedom of religion. It is the special duty of government
to provide this protection.”64
While the Church certainly has much to contribute and teach the world,
particularly with respect to human dignity and fundamental human rights,
the Church, which exists in society, can also learn much from society. 65
A number of Murray’s followers might agree with me that all issues of
discrimination, whether religious or cultural in nature, are matters of
public order. They are also issues that the Church needs to persuasively
62. See Avery Dulles’s classic work, AVERY CARDINAL DULLES, MODELS OF THE CHURCH
(2002) (deriving six major approaches from the writings of contemporary Protestant and Catholic
ecclesiologies). See also ORLANDO O. ESPÍN, IDOL & GRACE: ON TRADITIONING AND
SUBVERSIVE HOPE (2014) (proposing a theological approach that draws out the subversive
approach of the gospels and the role of the marginalized in passing along the Christian message).
63. On the sensus fidelium, see ORLANDO O. ESPÍN, Tradition and Popular Religion: An
Understanding of the Sensus Fidelium, in THE FAITH OF THE PEOPLE: THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS
ON POPULAR CATHOLICISM 63 (1997).
64. Pope Paul VI, Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 1, para. 7.
65. On human dignity, see Pope Paul VI, Gaudium et Spes: Pastoral Constitution on the Church
in the Modern World paras. 12–22 (Dec. 7, 1965), http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils
/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html. On how the
Church learns from the world, see id. at para. 44.
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address within a pluralistic society. There is an urgent need for public
consensus and just adjudication in legal processes concerning the defense
of religious freedom, particularly where religious institutions are exempt
from nondiscrimination laws that trump the exercise of individual
conscience.
Murray appealed to natural law as a way to argue for the renewal of
the American public consensus.66 In the spirit of Murray, we need a new
consensus that relies on an “ordering of reason,” as Thomas Aquinas
would argue, but surely, a reasoning process deeply rooted in historical
consciousness.67 A public consensus on issues of religious freedom and
nondiscrimination must be built and developed, tapping into the common
and shared wisdom of various Christian communities, of those belonging
to other faiths, or to no faith at all. All are equal heirs to this American
experience of honoring pluralism and fostering unity out of diversity, e
pluribus unum.68 As Murray would envision, this public consensus
should act as a check and balance within our democracy against any abuse
of power—be it religious or secular in origin. And lastly, while an
ordering of reason is essential in engaging a wide range of voices,
perspectives, and opinions, compassion must be embraced as a way to
temper polarizing and passionate conversations and agency on behalf of
religious freedom and on behalf of other human rights.
Religious leaders and advocates of religious freedom have been and
can continue to be a powerful force for good in society. They contribute
to construct public consensus when they stand on the side of individual
conscience and freedom and when they put into practice what the Church
teaches with respect to human rights and dignity, regardless of the issue
at hand. Singling out LGBTQ persons within Catholic institutions as the
only employees whose lives must be scrutinized weakens the Church’s
credibility as a voice of justice, a community of love and compassion,
and a builder of public consensus.69 As research evidences, “violations
66. MURRAY, supra note 3.
67. See Curran, supra note 3, at 253 (describing Thomas Aquinas’s understanding of natural
law as “ordered reason”).
68. Note that the argument Murray makes regarding the consideration of complex matters that
impact the elaboration of the public consensus, which he argues lies primarily in the hands of the
studium and wise (and not the institutional Church), while containing some value in terms of
empowering the laity can also be understood as elitist. See Curran, supra note 61, at 255 (explaining
Murray’s argument in more detail).
69. See Michael J. O’Loughlin, Firing of L.G.B.T. Catholic Church Workers Raises Hard (and
New) Questions, AMERICA (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-society/
2018/02/13/firing-lgbt-catholic-church-workers-raises-hard-and-new-questions (recognizing “at
least 80 people have been fired from Catholic parishes, schools and other entities in cases related
to sexual orientation over the past decade” and reporting on the consequential effects each instance
has on the Church).
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of religious freedom and agency both by governments and powerful
social actors, tend to reinforce oppressive structures that marginalize, or
prevent integration of, impoverished people, exploited women, migrants,
ethnic and religious minorities and outcasts.”70 But the Church can
undermine this fundamental human right when it relies on the ministerial
exception as a way for religious institutions to dismiss individual persons
whose views run counter to its official religious teachings. Within an
integral ecology of rights, all human rights must be protected.
We know from the recent and controversial ruling in Masterpiece
Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission that more conversations
are needed in matters regarding faith and public order.71 At present,
courts lack the ability to consider the diversity of religious perspectives
within the Church and society. Appeals to the ministerial exception need
to be carefully thought out so as not to endanger the value of human
conscience. Because legal precedent favors religious institutions and not
individual religious persons, the court’s major rulings so far leave little
room to honor the religious and dissenting views of individuals, their
religious freedom, and their consciences. Change must occur if we are to
embrace the option for the legally and religiously marginalized. This
difficult and oftentimes polarizing subject must be navigated within the
courts, especially when defending the religious freedom associated with
religious institutions comes into conflict with defending other legally
recognized human rights associated with marginalized voices and
communities.
This dilemma requires well-reasoned and compassionate voices to
address the following questions: Whose conscience prevails when
tensions between religious and social values ensue? Is it the
institutionalized conscience related to the religious body represented by
its official leaders, the informed conscience of individuals shaped by
religious and/or socio-political perspectives, or the conscience of
democratically elected political bodies and its leaders charged with
preserving the common good? Are the courts obliged by legal precedent
to take the side of the religious freedom of the institution or does our legal
system provide room to find ways to protect the religious freedom of
individuals in the spirit of John Courtney Murray with respect to official
70. See Allen D. Hertzke, Religious Agency and the Integration of Marginalized People, in
TOWARDS A PARTICIPATORY SOCIETY: NEW ROADS TO SOCIAL AND CULTURAL INTEGRATION
499, 499–529 (Pierpaolo Donati ed., 2018) (commenting on the “massive repression of . . .
empowering religious agency” and explaining how “religious discrimination serves as a major
driver of marginalization in numerous societies”).
71. See generally Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018).
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Roman Catholic teaching on religious freedom? How can the common
good best be served when tensions between religion, state, or any group
within society occur? And how can the constitutional rights of all human
persons within a democracy be protected, even while balancing
institutionally religious and individually religious held values?
In transitioning from “error has no rights” to only people—not ideas—
have rights, Murray set into motion a religious ethos and teaching that
has yet to be fully realized.72 Perhaps the time has come to consider,
without losing sight of the social and relational nature of human persons,
when institutional religious rights need to be legally checked in favor of
particular subjects to prevent the erosion of the very religious values and
freedom of conscience that these institutions rightly engendered and
defend within society. Faithful to American democracy, the courts must
continue to rule in favor of upholding the Church’s religious selfexpression. In turn, faithfulness to its teaching on religious freedom and
conscience requires that the Church and state both deepen their
understanding of our historical moment and expand support for all
Christian citizens and all women and men of good will. In continuity with
John Courtney Murray’s teaching on religious freedom, the Church and
the courts might do well to work together to safeguard the freedom of
individual conscience and thereby build public consensus around the
defense of universal human dignity and human rights.
As significant as the Catholic Church’s teaching in Dignitatis
Humanae was, this teaching remains an unfinished project. The Church’s
teaching on religious freedom must necessarily continue to be updated as
it engages in historically situated conversations related to human rights
and dignity. If the Church—institutionally speaking from the level of
international relations or locally speaking from the perspective of any
given democracy like ours—is to be judged as a credible and valuable
religious voice in the conversation about human rights issues, respected
in its right to freely express its religious convictions as an institution, and
an equal partner in the construction of the common good, it must be
willing not only to share with the world its religious wisdom as an “expert
humanity.” Its leaders must also be willing to receive and deepen this
understanding of humanity by engaging the world and people’s concrete
realities, whether these individuals come from the faithful or from the
world that shapes the Church’s existence. Just like it embraced worldly
and American wisdom in Dignitatis Humanae, the Church can continue

72. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 73–74; see also MCCLORY, supra note 6, at 8 (analyzing the
difference between the American and European approaches to “freedom of religion” and
“separation of church and state”).
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to dialogue with our particular cultural and American values so as to
deepen its own religious consciousness and its advocacy on behalf of
human rights and the dignity of all persons.73
As the United States ambassador to the Holy See, I witnessed the
tensions that often emerged between religiously and socio-politically
motivated values in efforts to defend basic human dignity, human rights,
and religious freedom of various communities, especially for the tens of
thousands of Christians and members of other minority groups that have
been displaced from their lands as a result war and violence. The same
appeal to religious freedom, human rights, and conscience that diplomats
invoke at the international relations level applies at the level of national
relations in efforts to defend underrepresented and marginalized
communities. If Murray teaches us anything, it is that even men and
women who disagree with the official teaching of the Church on any
given issue can still love the Church enough to change its teaching for the
sake of advancing the dignity of all.74 Making space for difference,
domestically and internationally, is a worthy civic cause and a God-given
call to build public consensus around issues that concern the common
good.75
A Christian’s first duty is to seek and act upon God’s liberating grace,
whether that grace is found within the Church, within society, or, even
more basically, within the wisdom of daily living offered through
countless men and women who struggle on behalf of human rights and
dignity. The end of the human being and its achievement, as Murray
rightly argued, is transcendent and supernatural, but this achievement is
truly a human achievement.76 Quoting Aquinas, Murray argues, “Grace
perfects nature, does not destroy it.”77 Indeed, because grace grows in
history, Christ’s body is “a-building here in time.”78
Murray’s words offer the Church a powerful reminder that defending
human dignity with respect to any human person or community within
our democracy is never an action contrary to the mission of the Church.
73. Pope Paul VI, Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 1.
74. See MCCLORY, supra note 6, at 26 (comparing Murray with Galileo, recognizing “Galileo
is very much in the tradition of other responsible dissenters: those who tried to open questions that
appeared to have been settled long ago, who sought to do so without contradicting the foundations
of religious faith, and who in the process made sacrifices”).
75. See JONATHAN SACKS, THE DIGNITY OF DIFFERENCE: HOW TO AVOID THE CLASH OF
CIVILIZATIONS 53 (2002) (“God, the creator of humanity, having made a covenant with all
humanity, then turns to one people and commands it to be different in order to teach humanity the
dignity of difference.”).
76. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 176–77.
77. Id. at 176.
78. Id. at 177 (emphasis added).
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Understood from Christian and Thomistic theological perspectives, the
social challenges we face are not simply concerns of the state but are also
issues that concern faith and the development of doctrine. Building peace
and public order is in full continuity with the ethical demands of building
Christ’s body. The business of the public square is the business of the
Church. Our central task today is “to consider the question of religious
freedom from a different perspective, to ask the questions about it in a
different way and by taking into consideration different premises and new
circumstances.”79 In so doing, we might remain faithful to Murray’s
methodology, allowing public consensus to build between advocates of
religious freedom and advocates of nondiscrimination laws so as to
advance an integral ecology of human rights.
Therefore, we pay tribute to Murray best not by repeating his answers—
that would entail the four doctrinal fallacies of fixism, archaism,
misplaced abstractness and anachronism—but by raising again his
question: what are the exigences of human dignity—particularly
regarding the religious dimension of the person—given present
circumstances?80

CONCLUSION
When Father Vincent McCormick, who was acting upon orders from
the Holy Office, delivered the blow to Murray that he was being silenced,
Father McCormick said, “I suppose you may write poetry. Between
harmless poetry and Church-State problems, what fields are taboo I don’t
know.” As a way to maintain the link between the exercise of religious
freedom and the exercise of human conscience and to draw attention to
our historical moment and the preferential option for the poor and
marginalized, I will end my reflections with a poem written by Reinaldo
Arenas. Arenas was a Cuban exile in the United States who devoted much
of his energy to writing “harmless” poems that equally challenged various
faces of human oppression and lifted the consciousness of various
marginalized persons and communities. He suffered from AIDS and died
on December 7, 1990. In his poem entitled Niño Viejo (Old Child), he
reminds us of the marginalized and forgotten child that lives in our midst
whose fundamental human dignity deserves to be recognized. Upholding
human conscience and dignity is truly the business of the laws in our land
and the business of any religion, including the Roman Catholic Church:
I am that child with the round, dirty face
who on every corner bothers you with his
“can you spare a quarter?”

79. HUDOCK, supra note 5, at 172.
80. Whitmore, supra note 23, at 171.
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I am that child with the dirty face
no doubt unwanted
that from far away contemplates coaches
where other children
emit laughter and jump up and down considerably
I am that unlikeable child
definitely unwanted
with the round dirty face
who before the giant street lights or
under the grandames also illuminated
or in front of the little girls that seem to levitate
projects the insult of his dirty face
I am that angry and lonely child of always,
that throws you the insult of that angry child of always
and warns you:
if hypocritically you pat me on the head
I would take that opportunity to steal your wallet.
I am that child of always
before the panorama of imminent terror,
imminent leprosy, imminent fleas,
of offenses and the imminent crime.
I am that repulsive child that improvises a bed
out of an old cardboard box and waits,
certain that you will accompany me.81

81. Reinaldo Arenas, My Lover the Sea, POEMHUNTER.COM, https://www.poemhunter.com
/poem/my-lover-the-sea-2/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).

